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 For over fifty years the Pacific Coast League was considered the highest level of 
organized baseball west of the Mississippi River.  As the population of the West grew in the 
1940s and 1950s, the Coast League attempted to use their geographic isolation and large 
population base as assets in an attempt to join the American and National Leagues as a third 
Major League.  This paper details how the Coast League members’ inability to agree on a 
strategy for League growth led to the collapse of the powerhouse that was the PCL. 
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Introduction 
From the earliest days of the twentieth century, professional baseball has served as equal 
parts entertainment and business.  The largest piece of both the entertainment and business 
aspects of the sport is represented by the two Major Leagues, the American and National 
Leagues, but neither league is capable of operating in a vacuum.  In order to develop the talent 
necessary to put on the show to entertain the masses, a great deal of time, expense and effort 
must go into the development of the future Major League players.  The teams of the two Major 
Leagues have always considered the cost in terms of man hours and in dollars spent to be too 
high to incur on their own.  Thus the minor league system was developed in a symbiotic 
relationship with the Majors.   
Traditionally, young players would be identified by minor league teams and signed to 
contracts by the minor league team.  At some point, if the player continued to develop into a 
productive ballplayer, one of two things generally happened.  A larger minor league team would 
agree to purchase the player’s contract from his original team for a larger price than he was 
originally signed for, allowing the first team to recoup their cost, and allowing the player to 
advance to a higher level of competition.  This would allow the player to continue to develop 
until his contract was either purchased by a Major League team or his value reached his peak in 
the minor leagues and he was left to finish his career playing for various minor league 
organizations as they were interested.   
Alternatively, a minor league team could refuse to sell off a player to larger leagues and 
teams until the player was declared eligible for the Major League draft, wherein a minor league 
player could be selected by a Major League team who would then purchase his contract from his 
minor league team for a fraction of what it would generally cost if he were sold prior to being 
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eligible for the draft.  This system was codified in an agreement between the various minor 
leagues and the two Major Leagues called the National Agreement in 1903.
1
  The agreement 
ensured that the Major Leagues got the best talent available without having to scout all of it 
themselves, while the minor leagues were able to be loaned players under Major League control 
who were not quite ready to play in the Major Leagues.   
The arrangement worked for both sides as the minor league teams were unlikely to be 
able to afford to keep the best players in the country playing in the small cities and towns where 
they were located, and Major Leagues teams were just as unlikely to be able to scout every 
amateur team that played in the small towns across the country.  This system was colloquially 
known as organized baseball.  The biggest challenge to the system occurred when a minor league 
believed it had the capability to retain its own players and the return of the loaned players from 
the major was not of equal value. 
 One of the largest challenges to this system was mounted by the Pacific Coast League 
(PCL) during the 1940s and 1950s.  The PCL was in a unique position compared to the other 
minor leagues of the mid-twentieth century, as they enjoyed geographic separation from the rest 
of the professional baseball world and therefore had a large population of baseball fans all to 
themselves.  Although the country’s population was expanding westward at a rapid pace, the 
American and National Leagues had failed to match the shifting population trends, meaning that 
no Major League teams were located west of the Mississippi River.  As a result PCL clubs were 
able to develop their own unique fan bases while other minor league clubs typically had to accept 
fans who had divided loyalties between the local minor league and the nearest Major League 
teams.    By the 1940s, the PCL was made up of eight teams in seven cities representing all three 
                                                 
1
 “General History: The History & Function of Minor League Baseball,” 2014, 
http://www.milb.com/milb/history/general_history.jsp. 
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of the Pacific Coast states, namely, the Los Angeles Angels, the Hollywood Stars, the San Diego 
Padres, the San Francisco Seals, the Oakland Oaks, the Sacramento Solons, the Portland Beavers 
and the Seattle Rainiers.   
The growth of the West Coast’s population led to civic leaders in the largest cities in the 
PCL to call for Major League teams in their cities, leading to a movement amongst PCL officials 
to become a third Major League in their own right in order to retain their largest and most 
valuable cities.  The effort would eventually prove fruitless as the League’s attempts would fail 
to gain traction and eventually the National League would come to occupy the PCL’s two most 
valuable cities, Los Angeles and San Francisco, when the Brooklyn Dodgers and New York 
Giants relocated to their respective new West Coast homes.  These twin moves have been 
generally regarded as the end of the PCL’s most prominent era. 
 The PCL’s challenge to the established supremacy of the American and National Leagues 
has made it a focus of writing on baseball history on numerous occasions since the League began 
its decline in the late 1950s.  Through these works which began appearing as early as the 1970s, 
three major trends in analyzing the PCL’s history emerge.  The earliest writings focus only on 
the PCL as it relates to Major League Baseball (MLB) and the reasons why MLB was motivated 
to deny their applications to become their own Major League.  This trend appeared first in the 
earliest analysis of the demise of the PCL appearing in 1974 and then recurred from the mid-
1990s and early 2000s, and may have been motivated by critics of the contemporary economic 
state of MLB.  The first historian to tackle the subject was Lance E. Davis with his work “Self-
Regulation in Baseball 1909-71,” which focuses primarily on the benefits the American and 
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National Leagues enjoyed by keeping the PCL as a minor league.
2
  Davis’s work appeared at a 
time when the business practices of MLB were being called into question for the controversial 
Player Reserve Clause, which was being challenged for restricting players from switching teams, 
thereby depressing their wages.  Edward G. White follows Davis’s line of thought in his 1996 
book, Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms Itself 1903-1953, which features the 
chapter, “The Enterprise 1923-1953.”
3
  White’s work focuses specifically on the harm the player 
draft did to the PCL’s ability to retain players and develop further as an independent league.  
Like Davis, White tackled the subject not long after MLB’s business practices were called into 
question, as they were published only two years after a players’ strike prematurely ended the 
1994 season.  This strike prevented the World Series from being played for the first time in 
ninety years and calling into question the high player salaries and the high cost of operation of 
Major League teams.   
The final two works through this lens of history both appeared in the early 2000s.  Robert 
Frederick Burk’s Much More than a Game: Players, Owners, & American Baseball since 1921, 
was released in 2001 and argues that the American and National Leagues intentionally set 
standards too high for the PCL to achieve in order to become its own Major League.
4
  
Additionally, Mitchell J. Nathanson’s article “The Irrelevance of Major League Baseball’s 
Antitrust Exemption: A Historical Review,” released in 2005 in the Rutgers Law Review, holds 
                                                 
2
 Lance E. Davis, “Self-Regulation in Baseball,” in Government and the Sports Business: Papers Prepared for a 
Conference of Experts, with an Introduction and Summary, ed. Roger G. Noll (Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution, 1974), 349–86. 
3
 G. Edward White, “The Enterprise 1923-1953,” in Creating the National Pastime: Baseball Transforms Itself, 
1903-1953 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 275–315. 
4
 Robert Fredrick Burk, “Men in Gray Flannel Suits,” in Much More than a Game: Players, Owners, & American 
Baseball since 1921 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 108–41. 
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that the two Major Leagues intentionally worked to displace the minor league teams from Los 
Angeles so they could occupy the city themselves.
5
 
 The bulk of histories written about the PCL tend to take a nostalgic look at the league and 
began appearing in the 1990s.  The nostalgia trend appeared as the last generation of fans to see 
the PCL at its peak in the 1940s and 1950s as children began to reach middle age, creating a 
natural impulse to look back at their childhoods.  The trend was launched by the work of Paul J. 
Zingg and Mark D. Medeiros with their book, Runs, Hits, and an Era: the Pacific Coast League, 
1903-1958, which was the first work to look at the League’s history in and of itself.
6
  This 
concept would be followed in the next twenty years with books focused on two of the PCL’s 
most prominent teams, first Richard Beverage’s 2011 work, The Los Angeles Angels of the 
Pacific Coast League: A History, 1903-1957, which examines Los Angeles’ leading team.
7
  
Next, P.J. Dragseth’s The 1957 San Francisco Seals: End of an Era in the Pacific Coast League 
discusses the final year of the League’s San Francisco franchise.
8
  William Marshall follows the 
nostalgic trend in his chapter, “A Stepchild in Peril,” appearing in Baseball’s Pivotal Era, 1945-
1951, which comments on the PCL’s struggles to overcome the control of the American and 
National Leagues to rise above their minor league status.
9
  Michael Lomax furthers this 
discussion in his article Not Quite Ready for Prime Time: The Pacific Coast League’s Attempt to 
Become a Third Major League, which focused the blame for the PCL’s inability to achieve a 
Major League promotion on the League’s failure to control the city of Los Angeles’ independent 
                                                 
5
 Mitchell J. Nathanson, “The Irrelevance of Major League Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: A Historical Review,” 
Rutgers Law Review 58, no. 1 (2005): 1–43. 
6
 Paul J. Zingg and Mark D. Medeiros, Runs, Hits, and an Era: The Pacific Coast League, 1903-58 (Urbana: 
Published for the Oakland Museum by the University of Illinois Press, 1994). 
7
 Richard E Beverage, The Los Angeles Angels of the Pacific Coast League a History, 1903-1957 (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland & Co., 2011). 
8
 P. J. Dragseth, The 1957 San Francisco Seals: End of an Era in the Pacific Coast League (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland & Co., 2013). 
9
 William Marshall, “A Stepchild in Peril,” in Baseball’s Pivotal Era, 1945-1951 (Lexington, Ky.: University Press 
of Kentucky, 1999), 259–62. 
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efforts to acquire their own Major League franchise.
10
  Charles D. Johnson echoes Lomax’s 
approach in his 2009 analysis of the final years of the San Francisco Seals.  “The Little 
Corporation: Professional Baseball in San Francisco,” examines the disorganization in the Seals’ 
ownership as the PCL’s efforts to become a Major League gradually fell apart.
11
  Dennis 
Snelling also examined the League’s history is this way in his book, The Greatest Minor League: 
A History of the Pacific Coast League, 1903-1957, which examines the League’s better days.  
The book also discusses the negative effects of news reporting focusing on the possibility of 
gaining Major League franchises as a factor in dividing and decreasing fan interest in the League 
as they attempted to make the final step toward the Major Leagues in the 1950s.
12
 
 The third perspective historians have taken in examining the PCL’s history is to explore 
the role of the League in preparing the West Coast for the arrival of American and National 
League teams.  Cary S. Henderson first explored this approach first explored in 1980.  He 
recounts the efforts undertaken by the Brooklyn Dodgers’ ownership to relocate to California to 
illustrate how attractive the Los Angeles market had become to existing Major League teams in 
his work “Los Angeles and the Dodger War.”
13
  Steve Treder also explores how attractive the 
Los Angeles market was to MLB in his article, “Open Classification: The Pacific Coast League’s 
Drive to Turn Major.” 
14
  Michael Lomax follows a similar path in his two articles, “Stadiums, 
Boosters, Politicians, and Major League Baseball’s Reluctance to Expand,” and “A Reshuffling 
Market: The Pacific Coast League’s Efforts to Become a Third Major League and How the 
                                                 
10
 Michael Lomax, “Not Quite Ready for Prime Time: The Pacific Coast League’s Attempt to Become a Third 
Major League in Baseball,” Journal of the West 47, no. 4 (Fall 2008): 14–25. 
11
 Charles D. Johnson, “The Little Corporation: Professional Baseball in San Francisco, 1953-1955,” The Baseball 
Research Journal 38, no. 1 (Summer 2009): 106–116. 
12
Dennis Snelling, The Greatest Minor League a History of the Pacific Coast League, 1903-1957 (Jefferson, N.C.: 
McFarland & Co., 2012).  
13
 Cary S. Henderson, “Los Angeles and the Dodger War, 1957-1962,” Southern California Quarterly 62, no. 3 
(October 1, 1980): 261–89, doi:10.2307/41170888. 
14
 Steve Treder, “Open Classification: The Pacific Coast League’s Drive to Turn Major,” NINE: A Journal of 
Baseball History and Culture 15, no. 1 (2006): 88–109, doi:10.1353/nin.2006.0059. 
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Braves Made Milwaukee Famous.”
15
  Treder and Lomax both point to the efforts by Los Angeles 
city officials to convince Major League franchises to relocate to the West Coast prior to the 
Dodgers’ and Giants’ relocations to California.  Richard O. Davies and Fran Zimniuch authored 
the final two analyses on the subject with their respective works, Sports in American Life: A 
History and Baseball’s New Frontier: A History of Expansion, 1961-1998; both works point to 
the success of the Dodgers in Los Angeles and the Giants in New York as proof that the West 




 This paper proposes that while the PCL had the capability to become the third Major 
League if the American and National Leagues had allowed it to do so, the attempt was ultimately 
undone not from outside tampering, but rather from a lack of cohesion in internal strategy.  This 
thesis will examine newspaper articles from both Los Angeles and Seattle as well as the minutes 
from both PCL meetings and those of the Seattle Rainiers as well as testimony given before a 
1951 House of Representatives Subcommittee hearing to illustrate the strategies taken by various 
club members during the League’s efforts to become a Major League.  In doing so this work will 
attempt to provide a bridge between the purely nostalgic histories of the PCL and those that 
examine the League purely as an incubator for American and National League expansion.  While 
other historians have looked at similar sources when crafting their histories, rarely have any done 
so in a way that looks at the interaction and differing viewpoints between clubs during the PCL’s 
                                                 
15
 Michael Lomax, “Stadiums, Boosters, Politicians and Major League Baseball’s Reluctance to Expand: An 
Exploration of Post-Second World War US Trends,” The International Journal of the History of Sport 25, no. 11 
(2008): 1511–1528, doi:10.1080/09523360802299260; Michael Lomax, “A Reshuffling Market: The Pacific Coast 
League’s Efforts to Become a Third Major League and How the Braves Made Milwaukee Famous,” in Northeast 
Popular Culture Association, 2012, http://fisherpub.sjfc.edu/nepca/conference/2012/55. 
16
 Richard O. Davies, Sports in American Life: A History, 2nd ed. (Hoboken: Wiley, 2011), 232-237, 
http://www.washington.eblib.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/patron/FullRecord.aspx?p=817330; Fran 
Zimniuch, Baseball’s New Frontier: A History of Expansion, 1961-1998 (Lincoln: UNP - Nebraska Paperback, 
2013). 
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most pivotal period in the late 1940s and early 1950s as they tried to become the third Major 
League.  
 Chiefly, the differences in strategy undertaken by the PCL’s three largest member cities, 
Los Angeles, San Francisco and Seattle, provided an excuse for the existing Major Leagues to 
deny or ignore the PCL’s applications for promotion or reclassification.  If Los Angeles had not 
looked outside the PCL to fulfill its Major League ambitions, if San Francisco had been able to 
convince its fellow league members to join with them in the needed spending spree to make the 
final case that the PCL was worthy, or if Seattle had agreed to spend and expand its stadium, the 
final result of the League’s applications may have been different.  If these three cities had been 
able to agree on a strategy, then the pressure applied to the Major Leagues by Congress may 
have been enough for them to grow into a Major League in their own right and have protected 
their separate West Coast baseball identity.  The fatal problem in the League’s attempt to become 
the third Major League was that the three cities that had the capacity to lead their league into a 
new era were unable to coordinate amongst themselves. 
Los Angeles 
 By 1941 Los Angeles had blossomed into a major American city, having seen its 
population grow from 319,198 in 1910 to a robust 1,504,277 by 1940.
17
  Following the area’s 
rapid growth, Los Angeles’s city leaders wanted their city to be seen as a first-rate city on par 
with its more established Eastern rivals, not as a distant outpost from true American society.  
Among the items of the agenda of the city’s boosters was the acquisition of a MLB team, which 
they hoped would help to erase any doubt that their domain had risen above any second-class 
                                                 
17
 “General Population By City Los Angeles County, 1910 - 1950,” Los Angeles Almanac, accessed November 3, 
2014, http://www.laalmanac.com/population/po26.htm. 
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designation older American cities could cast upon it, and leave behind their minor league status 
for good.   
To this end, in 1941 interests acting on behalf of the city began to negotiate with the 
owner of the St. Louis Browns, Donald Lee Barnes, to relocate the franchise to Los Angeles for 
the 1942 season, a move that seemed imminent until the bombing of Pearl Harbor disrupted the 
American League’s scheduled December 7, 1941 vote.
18
  The sudden threat of the potential loss 
of the Los Angeles market stunned the directors of the PCL into action.  As the nation dealt with 
the reality of the Second World War, the PCL office was laying the ground work for a more 
ambitious plan, one that they hoped would protect them from losing their most populous market 
and launch the league into a more prominent position.   
As early as December 1944, the PCL Directors authorized League President, Clarence 
Rowland, to begin applying to the American and National Leagues for recognition as their own 
Major League.
19
  As part of the directive to Rowland, the League Directors agreed not to sell or 
transfer their clubs or the right to operate in their cities to American or National League interests.  
The only hold out to this agreement were the Los Angeles Angels.
20
  The Angels had compelling 
reasons to reject the motion to bind the league members together for the cause of promotion: 
first, Los Angeles was the largest market in the league and thus was a more attractive destination 
for existing Major League franchises; second, Angels’ owner Charles Wrigley also owned the 
Chicago Cubs of the National League and stood to receive significant compensation from any 
                                                 
18
 Kevin Modest, “History of a Different Hue Before Pearl Harbor, St. Louis Browns were L.A.-Bound,” Los 




 “Minutes of Meeting of Pacific Coast League Board of Directors” (Statler Hotel, Buffalo, NY, December 6, 
1944), MS 4031 Box 2 Folder 6, Property of Dick Dobbins Collection, California Historical Society (hereafter 
referred to as Dobbins Collection). 
20
 Ibid. 
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transfer of his territorial rights to a Major League club, including ownership of other minor 
league franchises and their territorial rights as well as cash considerations.  While Wrigley would 
remain publically supportive of the league’s big league efforts, his club’s vote continued to 
suggest they were less than fully committed.
21
   Finally, Los Angeles had already shown the 
ability to attract a Major League team on its own merits, with game attendance already rivaling 
that of some Major League teams, and did not want to be constricted by the efforts of the weaker 
PCL markets in their labors to become a Major League city.
22
   
The PCL Directors would again vote for consideration as a Major League in December 
1945 with a goal to be recognized as an equal league to the American and National Leagues by 
the 1946 season, but once again the Angels were the lone holdout, with their representative Don 
Stewart, stating directly in the meeting that they no longer considered their territory bound to the 
decisions of the PCL.
23
  Despite Los Angeles’ lack of commitment, League officials were 
optimistic about their chances.
24
  This declaration meant that the Angels and Los Angeles felt 
they were free to secure an existing Major League franchise on their own without consideration 
for the efforts of the PCL’s successes or failures.  This put Los Angeles in the prime position to 
lobby for a team on their own while still being a party to the PCL’s promotion efforts if they 
                                                 
21
 Al Wolf, “Wrigley Favors Coast Major Loop: Owner of Cubs and Angels Feels Big-Time Baseball Should 








 “Minutes of Adjourned Session of Annual Meeting of Board of Directors of PCL” (Deshler-Wallick Hotel, 
Columbus, OH, December 4, 1945), MS4031 Box 2 Folder 6, Dobbins Collection. 
24
 Al Wolf, “Coast Loop Will Go Major Soon---Rowland,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), January 6, 1946, 
http://search.proquest.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/hnplatimes/docview/165649790/abstract/421C2BAE9C35
41BFPQ/635?accountid=14784. 
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proved successful.  Los Angeles’ independent position would remain a favorable one as the 
League’s initial application was rejected.
25
  
 The PCL would continue to agitate the American and National Leagues to be considered 
a Major League for the remainder of the 1940s.
26
  The established Major Leagues, however, 
consistently turned a deaf ear toward the PCL’s efforts, eventually drawing the interest of 
Congress.
27
  Instead, the Commissioner of Baseball’s Office authorized committees to travel to 
the coast and investigate the possibility of a Pacific Coast Major League, while dodging 
questions from anxious civic groups hopeful for their own Major League.
28
  As time passed, it 
became clearer that the power brokers in the American and National Leagues were unwilling to 
share their power with an upstart PCL.
29
    
The House Subcommittee on Monopoly took an interest in the lack of expansion in MLB.  
Until the 1950s, MLB was located only in the cities that were seen as being major American 
cities in the first decade of the twentieth century.  Congress saw the lack of change in the 
locations of MLB to be inconsistent with the changing shape of the population of the country and 
                                                 
25
 Al Wolf, “Pacific Coast’s Bid For Major Status Fails: Territorial Protection Refused,” Los Angeles Times (1923-




 Al Wolf, “P.C.L. Presses for Major Rating: Representatives Hold Advance Meeting to Adopt Resolution,” Los 














 Paul Zimmerman, “Sportscripts,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), July 24, 1946, 
http://search.proquest.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/hnplatimes/docview/165677034/abstract/421C2BAE9C35
41BFPQ/302?accountid=14784. 
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began to question the use of its monopoly power in restricting expansion or relocation into new 
markets.
30
   
The PCL saw the hearings convened by the Subcommittee in 1951 as a prime opportunity 
to state their case for promotion.  In the eyes of the PCL Directors they finally had a chance to 
plead their case to the nation that the West Coast was equally deserving of MLB as the East 
Coast and the Midwest.  While the hearings did not achieve the PCL’s intended result, they did 
begin to loosen the traditional markets’ grip on baseball, paving the way for the Boston Braves to 
relocate to Milwaukee.
31
  Despite surviving another PCL challenge to their supremacy, the Major 
Leagues received a clear message from the Subcommittee, give the West Coast a fair chance to 
gain Major League representation or face Congressional regulation.  As a result, when the PCL 
once again applied for consideration to be promoted, they received a response they seemed to 





Now with the requirements for promotion to Major League status clearly laid before the 
PCL, the teams representing its three most populous cities took three different approaches to the 
prospect of the League’s elevation.  The reaction of the cities, Los Angeles, San Francisco and 
Seattle, were key to any hope the PCL had of becoming the third Major League as each 
                                                 
30
 US Congress, House of Representatives, Study of Monopoly Power. Part 6: Organized Baseball: Hearing Before 




 Sess. Jul. 30 - Aug. 1, 3, 6-8, 10, 




 Lomax, “A Reshuffling Market,” 23-25. 
32
 “Major League Plan Would Assist Pcl,” Los Angeles Times (1923-Current File), November 15, 1951, 
http://search.proquest.com.offcampus.lib.washington.edu/hnplatimes/docview/166308462/abstract/3977E21DE24C
426BPQ/22?accountid=14784. 
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represented a large distinct regional base as well as being the three largest cities in the league.  
San Francisco may have had the most to lose, falling only second to Los Angeles in total 
population with 634,536 residents as of 1940, nearly a million less than that of its Southern 
California counterpart.
33
  This population difference made it difficult for San Francisco to attract 
an existing Major League team on its own while still being large enough to dwarf the population 
of the next largest city in the PCL.  This knowledge likely played into the thinking of San 
Francisco Seals owner, Paul Fagan, in becoming the most bullish and committed of the PCL 
owners toward Major League promotion.  Fagan’s optimism was shared by League President, 
Clarence Rowland, who believed that the League’s attributes were too impressive to be denied 
forever.
34
  As early as 1947, Fagan was willing to accept the suggestion of the Major League’s 
Commissioner’s Office that each of the PCL franchises should increase their spending to prove 
they were able to sustain the increased costs of operating on a Major League budget as compared 
to a minor league budget, while many of the smaller franchises expressed reservations over the 
proposal.
35
   
Fagan was also a key proponent in developing a middle step between the PCL’s long 
established “AAA” designation and outright Major League promotion.
36
  In order to help 
convince the Major Leagues they were worthy, the PCL proposed the concept of an “Open” 
designation, which would allow teams to protect their players from being drafted into the Majors 
for a longer period of time and allow increased opportunities to purchase players from lower 
                                                 
33
 “San Francisco County 1860-1940 Census Data,” Bay Area Census, accessed November 5, 2014, 
http://www.bayareacensus.ca.gov/counties/SanFranciscoCounty40.htm. 
34




“Minutes of the Special Meeting of the PCL Board of Directors” (St Francis Hotel San Francisco, CA, September 
1, 1947), MS 4031/16 Box 2 Folder 7, Dobbins Collection. 
36
 Ibid. 
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levels themselves.  The Open proposal fit nicely with Fagan’s goals as it suggested that PCL 
clubs raise the minimum player salary to a similar level of the Major Leagues, thus proving the 
PCL clubs were capable of supporting the higher payrolls, which they would be required to meet 
if they ever did become the third Major League.  In return the PCL requested that the American 
and National Leagues grant them a longer period of control over players before they were made 
available for the Major League draft and the freedom to move Major League players back to 
their former PCL teams without the risk of losing control of the players to other major or “AAA” 
teams.
37
  The idea of the proposal was to exchange higher team expenditures for the ability to 
keep high-profile players in the PCL for as long as possible to increase fan interest on the West 
Coast.  This in turn would lead to higher attendance, which would then require larger stadiums 
that would meet minimum Major League standards in all PCL markets.  MLB, however, was 
unwilling to forgo the ability to acquire talent at cheap rates before players’ abilities began to 
erode and ignored the idea of even incremental elevation for the PCL until pressured by 
Congress to expand their territories.   
The Seals would eventually also strive to meet the Major Leagues’ demands for larger 
stadiums by expanding the seating capacity at their ball, Seals Stadium in 1946.  The expansion 
of the stadium was so successful that it would eventually host the rechristened San Francisco 
Giants for their first two seasons after relocating from New York in the late 1950s.   As a means 
toward making the PCL a more likely candidate for elevation, it however was unsuccessful.  
Instead of leading a charge for ambitious owners to renovate and expand their own stadiums, 
Fagan’s attempt stood alone among PCL owners and eventually led to significant financial 
losses, forcing him to sell the team in 1953.   
                                                 
37
 Ibid. 
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Following the collapse of the Fagan ownership, the Seals’ position as a financial 
powerhouse within the PCL quickly faded.  No longer was the team able to hold onto its 
premium players for as long, nor were they able to acquire the more expensive veteran players 
which they had relied on during the Fagan years.  Finally, the Seals were forced to accept 
financial assistance from the Boston Red Sox, becoming an official affiliate of the American 
League team, which ended any ambition the franchise had for PCL elevation. 
Seattle 
 As the PCL Operators in San Francisco pursued their aggressive strategy for PCL 
elevation, the majority of the league followed a more conservative strategy.  This strategy was 
evident in the actions and attitudes of the Seattle Rainiers’ owners.  By 1940, Seattle had grown 
to become the third largest city in the league, behind Los Angeles and San Francisco.  But while 
the two leading cities enjoyed a large gap between themselves and their fellow West Coast cities, 
Seattle had only slightly 60,000 more residents than its closest rival, Portland.
38
  Seattle also only 
had slightly more than half the population of San Francisco, 634,536 to 368,302.
39
  As such, the 
realities that faced the Rainiers were a closer match for the rank and file of the PCL, for Seattle 
was a growing city, but had not reached a point where it could command the attention of the 
traditional Eastern markets on its own.   
It is therefore telling that while the Seals favored an aggressive and expensive campaign 
to make the PCL’s case as a third Major League, the Rainiers embraced a much more 
conservative course.  This would allow the Rainiers to benefit if they happened to gain Major 
League status, but would not hinder their operations as a minor league operation if they did not.  
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In fact, while Los Angeles and San Francisco exhibited great enthusiasm at Major League 
possibilities, Seattle expressed a much more cautious tone at the news of the attempt.
40
  The 
attitude of Seattle owner Emil Sick began to reveal itself at the same League meeting where 
Fagan began to push for the heavy spending option.  Sick declared his opposition to any 
measures that were potentially harmful to any PCL member.
41
  While Sick’s declaration did not 
at first clearly point to opposition to any Major League efforts on the PCL’s behalf, it certainly 
signaled a reluctance to make any moves that would leave behind the smaller clubs within the 
League, which points to a reluctance to spend any more on the effort than absolutely necessary.
42
 
 Sick’s position would be clarified by his actions during the Rainiers’ internal meetings in 
the months following the presentation of Fagan’s ambitions.  In November 1946, after the 
conclusion of the season where the Seals had unveiled their expanded capacity stadium in hopes 
of advancing their case as a Major League city, Sick and his board only approved funds for the 
repairs of the existing seating at their own ballpark, Sick’s Stadium.
43
  The lack of importance 
the prospect of promotion held for the Seattle club was further expressed as the minutes of the 
November stockholders’ meeting make only a passing references to an update from a PCL 
lawyer about the League’s Major League application, with no detail or enthusiasm for the matter 
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 “Minutes of the Special Meeting of the PCL Board of Directors.” 
42







 “Seattle Rainiers’ 1947 Special Meeting of the Board of Directors” (300 Airport Way Seattle, WA, November 24, 
1947), MSSC 139 Box 2 Folder 5, P 138, Washington State Historical Society Collections (hereafter referred to as 
WSHS). 




  While city and team officials in Los Angeles and San Francisco were openly 
jockeying and agitating to get the attention of either current Major League teams or advance the 
chances of promoting the PCL as a whole, Seattle was more than willing to accept a wait-and-see 
approach, but was not willing to risk any major spending in hopes of catching the eyes of the 
Majors. 
 Seattle’s caution continued even as the Major Leagues finally seemed to be opening a 
door to the PCL’s ambitions.  Facing increased scrutiny from Congress in 1951, the Majors 
offered the PCL a set of guidelines to meet if they wished to be worthy of becoming the third 
Major League.  The guidelines emphasized salaries paid to players, city population, average fan 
attendance, and, importantly, the seating capacity of the teams’ stadiums.  The Rainiers 
responded to the news the Seals, the PCL head office and the city of Los Angeles had been 
waiting for since the mid-1940s by explicitly deciding to spend money on Sick’s Stadium for 
repair, not the stadium improvements necessary to meet the conditions set forth by the Major 
Leagues.
45
   
The Seattle position was becoming clear; the Major Leagues would have to come to 
them.  They would not risk spending the extra money to declare a need to come to the Majors.  
This position may not have helped the League’s promotion chances, but may have been the most 
reasonable one.  Though Los Angeles and San Francisco may have had the resources to take the 
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extra risk on a Major League bid, the smaller league cities may have struggled to meet Major 
League standards as described by the American and National Leagues.
46
   
As the 1950s wore on and it became increasingly clear that the likelihood of the PCL 
becoming the Pacific Coast Major League was faint at best, the Rainiers did not fight against the 
coming invasion of the National League into the PCL’s territory.  By late 1957, the relocations of 
the Dodgers and Giants to Los Angeles and San Francisco respectively seemed to be a fait 
accompli.  Instead of fighting for the continued supremacy of the PCL as the best baseball on the 
West Coast, Seattle began to discuss what financial compensation they were due for the invasion.  
In a November 1957, meeting Sick and the Rainiers’ Advisory Board were informed by legal 
counsel that they were entitled to compensation for the loss of the profitable Los Angeles and 
San Francisco markets as PCL members with Sick, concluding simply that the PCL would, “have 
to live with baseball people,” and would only seek legal action when, “seriously damaged by 
reason of said Major League action.”
47
   
Seattle’s defeatist attitude toward PCL promotion may have been the most realistic one 
but the team also played a key role in limiting the potential of the movement before it became a 
realistic possibility.  Had Seattle been a rallying force for the smaller market teams, perhaps 
other cities could have stood beside Los Angeles and San Francisco and found a way to extend 
the PCL’s lifespan as the best baseball played west of the Mississippi River. 
Congressional Pressure 
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 The questions of the business practices of professional baseball led to a series of hearings 
called by the U.S. House of Representatives Subcommittee on Monopoly Power in 1951.  These 
hearings were motivated by the proposal of three bills in the House of Representatives which 
called for organized professional baseball to be exempted from federal anti-trust laws.
48
  Chaired 
by Representative Emmanuel Celler of New York, the hearings called into question the way the 
Major Leagues had responded to the PCL’s requests to become a third Major League, among 
other things.  Celler questioned organized baseball’s ability to govern itself, and considered 
whether to formally grant it an anti-trust exemption as the sport had been operating under a de 
facto exemption since the 1910s.   
Organized baseball in the early 1950s was facing an increased amount of scrutiny on a 
few key issues, “the reserve clause, the farm system, the powers of the high Commissioner, 
franchises and draft problems, and the geographical distribution of the clubs.”
49
  The reserve 
clause allowed teams to reverse the “rights” to a player until they chose to either trade or 
terminate the player, which artificially allowed teams to control player salaries as players were 
unable to market their skills to the highest bidder.
50
  The farm system and the draft both related 
to the control and limits thereof Major League clubs were allowed to exhibit on their minor 
league counter parts.  The powers of the Commissioner referred to the wide ranging executive 
powers granted allowed to Commissioner of Baseball.  The change in law was debated by 
Congress as organized baseball found itself facing a number of legal challenges to their de facto 
anti-trust exemption and was seeking to make it a legal exemption to dodge these challenges.
51
  
The PCL saw an opportunity in these hearings to argue that the Major Leagues were conspiring 
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against them and that the threat of losing any anti-trust protection would be enough pressure to 
force them to grant the PCL Major League status. 
The PCL’s strategy was to raise concerns on two of the issues the Subcommittee was 
investigating, the draft system, which they felt unfairly deprived their teams of talent without 
reasonable compensation, and the location of teams.  Among the concerns of the Subcommittee 
was the inability of MLB to adapt to the changing population trends of the United States, as the 
locations of American and National League franchises had remained unchanged since the 1910s 
even though the population of the nation had continued to expand westward.  The second witness 
called before the Subcommittee was National League President, Ford C. Frick.  Frick played a 
major role in the Major Leagues’ consideration of the West Coast as a potential Major League 
territory.  The National League President would endure heavy directed questioning on the failure 
of the American and National Leagues to expand their operations to the West Coast or accept the 
application of the PCL to become the third Major League.  The first line of questioning directed 
to Frick on the subject related toward the practice in baseball of granting franchises territorial 
rights to their cities, which served to prevent new clubs from competing in a team’s territory 
without permission.  Frick maintained that the practice had no bearing on the possibility of 
spread of the MLB to the West Coast arguing that territorial rights were:  
Nothing that prevent a new comer from operating in any city of his choosing.  Nor is 
there any rule that forbids a change in classification on the part of a lower classification 





Frick argued that it was the choice of the PCL not to become a Major League, having nothing to 
do with the decisions or authority of the American or National Leagues.  Frick insisted he 
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actually hoped for the establishment of a third Major League on the West Coast in the coming 
years, but that the League had yet to decide to take the steps necessary to fill that void.
53
 
 The National League President’s argument appeared to be at odds with the attitudes of 
PCL leaders, an issue about which Subcommittee members harshly questioned him.  The 
Subcommittee first called to Frick’s attention correspondence dating back as far as 1939 from 
Los Angeles civic leaders stating their readiness for a Major League team, as well as similar 
letters from similar groups representing San Francisco in the interim.
54
  Frick admitted to taking 
no official action toward the petitions from West Coast civic groups, but did acknowledge the 
PCL’s initial application to become the third Major League.
55
  The National League President 
then opted to place the blame for the lack of expansion at the feet of the PCL itself, saying that 
the League had met with Major League officials in 1947, but they had opted to drop their 
application when they were informed of the costs necessary to operate on the Major League 
level, and had not reapplied in the following years.
56
  When pressed by Chairman Celler, 
however, Frick was forced to admit that he attended a National League meeting in June of 1947 
that adopted a resolution that, instead of addressing the PCL’s request, recommended expanding 
the Major Leagues only by adding two teams at a time into the existing Major Leagues.
57
  This 
recommendation raised the question of the Major Leagues’ willingness to operate with the PCL’s 
applications in good faith.  Instead of deciding if the PCL’s members were capable of operating 
at the level of Major League teams, they were in fact considering carving up the League’s 
territory for their own benefit, whenever they decided they were ready to expand their 
membership.   
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Frick’s ability to be impartial toward the Western cities was further called into question 
when a report he helped author describing the suspected ability of PCL member cities to support 
Major League franchises was entered into the record.  The report was a product of a Major 
League exploratory committee’s trip to the West Coast to investigate the PCL’s application.  The 
report found that of the PCL’s seven member cities, only Sacramento and San Diego lacked the 
capacity to grow into Major League markets within the next few years.
58
  Upon further 
testimony, Frick conceded that San Diego also had an opportunity to become a sufficient Major 
League city, leaving Sacramento as the only League member with which the President could find 
an insurmountable fault.
59
  Frick was also forced to acknowledge that he was aware of continued 
PCL applications for either Major League promotion or the creation of a middle ground status 
between minor and Major Leagues after 1947, on which MLB had failed to act. 
The National League President’s dismissive attitude toward the PCL continued to be 
illustrated when Damon Miller, the Secretary and Business Manager for the San Francisco Seals, 
was called to give testimony on the PCL’s attempts from the perspective of one of the leading 
PCL franchises.  Miller testified that when the PCL first approached the Major Leagues about 
becoming the third Major League they were told to build their stadiums up to a Major League 
standard and then reapply.
60
  The Seals franchise saw this request as impractical as they were 
unable to attract a larger fan base that would require a larger ballpark, while still being forced to 
surrender their best players and biggest box office draws to Major League franchises.
61
  Miller 
argued that in order for the Major Leagues to negotiate with the PCL in good faith they needed to 
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recognize that the Majors were receiving a larger benefit in keeping the PCL as a minor league 
than the PCL received from being held at that status.   
From Miller’s perspective, the only way for the PCL to have a chance to meet the Major 
Leagues’ undefined standards for promotion was for the Majors to create a new designation with 
new privileges that would enable PCL teams to build themselves up to the standard of play 
necessary to be competitive at the Major League level.  When questioned on the possibility of a 
middle ground between Majors and minor league status, Frick had ruled out that option, arguing 
that it would be unfair to the other minor leagues to grant the PCL an exceptional status, while at 
the same time admitting that the PCL was in an exceptional situation owning to its high 
population in a region with no competition from the existing Major Leagues.
62
   
Frick and Miller’s testimony agreed on one issue, the PCL was involved in defeating its 
own application.  Frick maintained the PCL voluntarily dropped its application when the League 
owners were shown balance sheets that indicated the cost of operating a Major League 
franchise.
63
  By taking this attitude, Frick argued that the West Coast was ripe for future Major 
League inclusion, allowing the National League President to dodge any questions of intentional 
exclusion from the Subcommittee.  Miller’s testimony, meanwhile, excused the lack of action 
taken by the American and National Leagues on the PCL’s application as the owners of the PCL 
teams had been unclear in their applications about what exactly they wanted from the bigger 
leagues.
64
  Did they want to immediately become a Major League, did they want finical 
information regarding the cost needed to operate as a Major League, or did they want a new 
intermediate status, which would allow them evolve into a Major League in time?  Once again 
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the PCL’s inability to agree on whether they wanted to become their own Major League, join the 
Major League as individual markets, or find some middle ground between the Majors and the 
minors doomed the PCL to remain under the thumb of the American and National Leagues and 
eventually to have their most important cities carved away from them. 
The Bigger Picture 
 By the middle of the twentieth century the nature of the United States was changing, the 
nation’s population was shifting and the cultural dominance once found in the East was slowly 
fading.  The rapidly growing film industry made Los Angeles and by extension California an 
exporter of culture.  No longer was New York the sole predominant origin point for what the rest 
of the country would see as fashionable or popular.  Technology also allowed California and the 
West Coast as a whole to rapidly expand in decades to sizes that had taken the East Coast the 
better part of two centuries.  The presence of the railroad, and the Panama Canal starting in the 
late nineteenth century made travel to the Pacific Coast states much less daunting.  It was no 
longer necessary to undertake a perilous overland journey that would last for months, or else a 
longer trip to sail around the whole of South America.  Now it was possible to reach the furthest 
western points of the country in a matter of weeks, if not days, meaning that a trip to the West 
Coast need not be a one-way journey.  It was now a vacation trip for an increasing number of 
Americans.  The advent and popularization of commercial air travel cut the travel time between 
the coasts to a single day.   
The ease of access to the coast led to a population boom in the West during twentieth 
century, which saw the Western states grow at twice the rate of the other regions of the country 
 Beireis 28 
 
in all but one decade between 1900 and 1960.
65
  The need for additional labor on the West Coast 
by the defense industry during the 1940s, resulted in an influx of newcomers.  By 1950, the 
Western states represented 13% of the United States’ population, up from 5.4% of the population 
in 1900, and by far the fastest growing region of the country.
66
   
As the population shifted from East to West the public clamored for the same 
entertainment options offered back in the East, including baseball.  While the PCL helped fill the 
void left by the Major Leagues on the West Coast, it still seemed a slight to the residents of the 
most prominent Western cities that the players of their beloved local teams were constantly ripe 
for the picking by the Majors suggesting that their cities were not as important as those in the 
lofty American and National Leagues. 
 The appetite for MLB in the West opened a door for the most attentive Major League 
owners, Walter O’Malley of the Dodgers and Horace Stoneham of the Giants.  Neither owner 
necessarily wanted their teams to move from the profitable New York market, but allowed 
themselves to be swayed into looking elsewhere when city officials rejected demands to use New 
York public funds to help finance new stadiums to replace the ballparks the Giants and Dodgers 
had deemed outdated and crumbling.
67
  Instead O’Malley and Stoneham were convinced by civic 
interests in Los Angeles and San Francisco, to relocate their franchises to the West Coast in 
exchange for promises of brand new, state of the art, and publically financed new stadiums.
68
  
This move launched a trend that continues into the modern day of professional sports, which sees 
an owner declare their stadium outdated and demand that the public spare no expense in building 
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a brand new one, with all the best and most modern features ever dreamed of.  If the local 
governments refuse to pay, the owner will seek out new ones and move their team to wherever 
they will be gifted a new stadium or arena.
69
  Thus, in moving their teams from New York to 
California not only did O’Malley and Stoneham cause the collapse of the only minor league to 
ever challenge the supremacy of the Major Leagues, they also created a lasting precedent that 




 The discord in strategy between the PCL’s three leading cities, Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and Seattle, proved to be the League’s undoing.  Instead of banding together and 
leading the charge for the entire League becoming its own Major League, the three separate 
strategies of the Angels, Seals, and Rainiers arrested the League’s forward momentum.  This 
lack of cohesion eventually allowed the National League to steal away the PCL’s two most 
important markets leaving the rest of the League behind.  The Los Angeles Angels were content 
to stand pat and allow boosters to lobby the American and then the National Leagues to relocate 
to their city.  The San Francisco Seals attempted to rally the League as a whole to raise spending 
and improve the ballparks across the League in order to capitalize on a moment of opportunity 
gained from the pressure applied to the existing Major Leagues by Congress and become their 
own Major League.  This proposal was undercut by the Seattle Rainiers’ unwillingness to make 
anything but necessary improvements to their facilities, feeling that any excess spending by the 
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franchises in cities that lacked the population base of Los Angeles and San Francisco would 
create undue risk for League members.   
This inability to coordinate or agree on a strategy by the three leading League members 
allowed the Major Leagues to undercut the pressure applied by Congress in the hearings held by 
the U.S. House Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power, just when it appeared that the 
Subcommittee was willing to press the baseball powers for real change in their organization.  As 
a result, the Los Angeles and San Francisco markets remained open to invasion by National 
League teams in 1958, which caused what is generally considered the end of the PCL’s most 
significant period.  This turn of events leads to the question, what purpose the PCL was supposed 
to serve in baseball history?  Was the PCL merely meant to prepare the West Coast for inclusion 
in the American and National Leagues?  If so, it achieved its ultimate purpose and then naturally 
faded into history in the aftermath of the relocation of the Dodgers and Giants.  Or, was the 
purpose of the League to chart its own course and allow the West Coast to create something as 
significant as the East Coast had done more than a half century earlier?  By failing to create their 
own Major League, the PCL failed in this objective and missed the opportunity to establish a 
cultural institution in the world of sports the equal of its predecessors in the East. 
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